

THE NEW

STATESMAN AND NATION



The Week-end Review

Vol. XXI. No. 515

[Incorporating
THE ATHENÆUM]

SATURDAY, JANUARY 4, 1941

[Registered at the G.P.O.]
as a newspaper

SIXPENCE

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THE 1941 CAMPAIGN

THE turn of the year makes no natural break in the conduct of total warfare. Modern armies do not relapse into winter quarters. Though there are days when no pilot can reckon on a safe landing, the battle in the air continues, and we must expect many a repetition of the tactics of arson from which the City of London has suffered. The submarine may be more difficult to fend off during the long nights of winter than in the brighter months. None the less, within these limits, it is probable that Hitler will again time his major effort more or less on the model of last year. During winter he trains and prepares for the decisive stroke with the most elaborate foresight: at any time from March to May the blow may fall. It is conceivable that the threat of an invasion, which General von Brauchitsch repeated the other day in the plainest words, may be a bluff designed to keep our land and sea forces immobilised within and around this island. That purpose has been attained during half a year, when we might have used some part of them to greater advantage in the Mediterranean. But, sooner or later, the attempt will have to be made. The maintenance of German prestige after threats so explicit requires it, and if by a miracle it could succeed, it is the only means by which the war might be brought to a swift end. But Hitler's soldiers, we should suppose, will not attempt it until they have done much more to isolate us from America by the submarine campaign and to disorganise our nerve centres by aerial attacks on an even greater scale than we have yet experienced. Mr. De Valera has learned nothing from the fate of Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, and he will enjoy a good fortune that he has not earned, if his country, incapable of any serious defence against a modern mechanised army, escapes a landing in the first phases of the decisive attack.

On the assumption that the main offensive in the coming year will fall in one element or another upon this island, does it follow that the German High Command must concentrate all its forces on this undertaking? Certainly it has men enough and planes enough to carry on other major operations elsewhere at the same time. The considerations that might deter it from scattering its forces are rather the need

for economising oil, which it cannot squander recklessly on transport over vast distances, and the uncertainty of Russia's behaviour. To watch the Russians and the Turks it must keep a big force in the East. Rumour has been busy during the past fortnight in the amusing game of transporting great German armies over the Brenner Pass into Italy, and across Hungary into Rumania. These stories leave us sceptical. We doubt whether the Duce has yet called on the Germans to save him, either from his own people or from the Greeks, though he may one day be compelled to pocket his pride so far. The only disquieting news in this connection is that considerable reinforcements could be conveyed the other day to Valona, in spite of the fact that our fleet had recently seemed to hold command of the Adriatic. We do not doubt that the Germans have a few Divisions in Rumania and may be adding one or two more to their number. This occupation is designed in the first place to protect the oil wells and to speed up the re-organisation of all the production and transport of this backward but potentially wealthy country to supply German needs. The second purpose is presumably to put pressure on the Russians and the Turks and to prepare bases from which, if the need should arise, they could be attacked. But we should be astonished if at any early date the Germans were to attempt any considerable operation in the Balkan Peninsula. Spain offers them a far more favourable field, even if General Franco, in his desperate economic plight, prefers to remain the non-belligerent ally of the Axis. Winter is no obstacle to campaigning in Portugal and Southern Spain, and the possession of their Atlantic ports would enable the German submarines to intensify their war upon our shipping.

But if Hitler intends to give us battle seriously in the Mediterranean, he must acquire a fleet. That is, we take it, the key to his present behaviour towards Italy and France. He would not assign to the Duce any share in the booty of prostrate France, nor is he in a hurry to help her, for the outstanding reason that the Italian fleet under its own crews is useless and much of it has been too seriously damaged to tempt him to man it with German crews. What he wants

from Marshal Pétain is the use of his ships and the arsenal of Toulon. From the still serviceable ships of the two Fleets he might, under German officers, make a force that could engage us in these waters. The reluctance of the aged Marshal to consent to this extortion would not in itself deter him for a moment. There are Doriots and Déats who would oblige him, nor do we suppose that M. Flandin would resist him. But France has still one asset: her intact army of North Africa, which could be used in Libya or Spanish Morocco or even in Spain. There is reason to believe that Weygand and Pétain will act together and that to this ultimate baseness they will not consent.

The military prospect, hopeful in the Mediterranean, has been brightened still further by Mr. Roosevelt's fireside talk. It is much the boldest of his utterances: he spoke it with victory behind him. It was the speech of a non-belligerent ally, whom no fear of opposition from his own people can now deter. Whatever Mr. Willkie might have said or done, of one thing we may be sure, the nominee of Wall Street would not have eliminated the dollar sign from Anglo-American dealings. What concrete steps Mr. Roosevelt proposes in order to turn the United States into our arsenal, we shall learn in a few days when Congress re-assembles. Very much remains to be done, for the flow of planes, tanks and munitions to our ports is still slow. The motor industry, enjoying a boom in the production for the home and some foreign markets of cars for civilian use, has still to be commandeered for the war effort. It may be that the President will take the daring step of releasing the interned ships of other belligerents for our use, and he may extend to the Chinese and to the Greeks help of the kind that he offers to us.

Economic Reflections

It is customary at this time of the year to pause for reflection on the lessons of the past year. In contrast to the heartening turn in the fortunes of war in the Mediterranean the Government can draw little satisfaction from their accomplishments in the field of war-economics. Much has been accomplished by the common people who after the change of the Government last spring worked longer hours than ever before and maintained output far better in the face of air attacks than could have been expected in view of the repeated breakdown of officialdom in conditions of strain. Our Ministers (Mr. Churchill is the obvious exception) have still not even yet learnt the terrible lessons of the opening months of the last year. The spirit of that ill-fated production of the wondrous mountain in Bloomsbury, "The Assurance of Victory," is still haunting in their speeches. Instead of following their leader in his sober and therefore encouraging appraisals of the position the note of complacency is reappearing. This complacency is the more irritating as an increasing number of people feel the unnecessary and unjust hardships inflicted by official inadequacy. Evacuation, fire fighting, provision of shelters (and cement), assurance of fair distribution of scarce supplies, price-policy, the full use of available and willing man-power, compensation for war damage—these are all problems which even after sixteen months of war and seven months after the grant of full powers to the Executive by an enthusiastic Parliament, have not been solved. There is no coherent plan to mobilise industry, transport is in a mess, financial policy is still drifting and with it price and wage-policy; consumption is still excessive and the distribution of supplies uneven; there is no accepted plan for ensuring a fair distribution of the burden of war: the wretched treatment of soldiers' dependants, of the people penalised by Government measures continues and even the air-raid compensation Bill—an advance on previous official thought—bears the marks of the narrowest financial spirit. The system of priorities has still not been replaced by planned allocations and is therefore unable to ensure maximum effort on the most needed points. Preparations for the foreseeable air-offensive are insufficient. The central co-ordination and leadership which has produced such magnificent results in the field of defence is conspicuous by its absence in war-economics. Beyond the routineers, beyond those numbers of the Old Guard which had to be included in a National Government, there looms the problem of the Labour Leaders. They could have given a clearer lead. They had time to contemplate the evils of this half-way house which must in the long run turn against labour. They must in the New Year show a different grasp

of the position if we are to follow up the victories against the "meaner partner" by a renewed repulse of the mightier foe.

Part of the trouble—as our leading article shows—is that co-ordination and planning are impossible because the nature of the war economic problem is not understood. A pale double of the Geddes Axe walks still about frightening and injuring those who have no power or voice to squeal. The ghost of the financial conception of economics has not been laid. But above all there is a fundamental and fatal misconception about the word compulsion. Mr. Bevin accuses all and sundry who demand a coherent planning of the use of man-power of being dictators. But he is forced to de-reserve a growing proportion of labour and thus force them into seeking new jobs instead of offering it to them according to a careful plan. More than that: he de-reserves certain occupations provided the employer does not prove that the man he employs is needed for national service. And he does not establish hardship tribunals. The change from reserving occupations to reserving jobs is to the good, but it seems scarcely worth while to pretend that it is not compulsion. And why pretend that the total de-reservation of occupations is different from compulsion? Those who ask for fuller use of compulsory powers also demand compulsion for some forms of property. They ask for safeguards which the Minister does not provide and above all they demand full compensation by paying the people who are being shifted their previous wage (subject to a maximum) and the cost arising out of the shift (separation allowances, billeting), and that accommodation should be secured by compulsion. The burden is once more put on the shoulders least capable to bear it and the privilege of voluntary effort is being reserved to the more comfortable. We are still appealed to by Archbishops for country billets, Sir Robert Kindersley still stalks the country for savings, Sir Kingsley Wood and even Lord Woolton still kindly warn the rich of impending imports and shortages and then beg them to refrain from acting on the implied advice. When will Labour Ministers at last realise what is happening? It is time for them to forgo demagogic phrases and self-satisfied claims until they have shown results which will convince the common man that we are no longer a plutocracy and that our leaders are in fact "going to it."

Fires and Spotters

The devastating fire-raid on the City was a severe blow. We are not impressed by the official attempt to represent it as a new development, particularly in the insistence that it was a deliberate attempt to destroy London. What on earth do the authorities think was the purpose of previous raids? Some of the losses are heartrending, and the beastliness and futility of modern war was never more starkly illustrated to our people. We are not being callous when we take some comfort in the fact that the scale and the scope of the destruction has cleared the way for some real planned reconstruction. If St. Paul's is left to us it can now be given its fitting and open setting. When a few buildings are knocked out of an ugly thoroughfare it is too much to hope that complete reconstruction will be carried through, but when an area is largely devastated then something comprehensive can and must be done. The problem of fire-spotting has to be solved, and the authorities ought not to have been caught napping. At the beginning of the air Blitzkrieg Ministers were warned privately and publicly of this gap in our precautions. It is for the Government to exercise foresight. Citizens will be less liable to "fail in their duty" if they have clear and definite instructions. The idea of spotters in every building, however, raises immense problems: the number of men and man-hours involved is astronomical. The numbers needed would be less and the job of the spotter would be more possible if our inventions department would take notice of a simple little gadget, referred to them a month or more ago, which rings a burglar alarm and identifies the room and releases the front-door key in any house hit by an incendiary or delayed-action bomb.

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WAR ECONOMICS REVIEWED

Two agitations are being conducted at the present moment, one for a reduction in the Excess Profits Tax and the other for increasing compulsion of labour. The first is based on the peacetime arguments for the profit incentive: the second on the argument that the peacetime mechanism is inadequate. What are we to make of this flagrant contradiction? It is typical of our war economy. Is the mixture of economic freedom and compulsion another happy British compromise or is it an illogical and dangerous makeshift? The peacetime economic system has a body of principles. Some of us disagree with them, some of us criticise them as harsh and inadequate but they are a body of principles. Are there any economic principles for a system of total war?

The war could be conducted mainly by the methods of capitalist private enterprise—that is to say, the war economy could be regulated by the free price mechanism. Doubtless these methods would have to be supplemented by certain forms of compulsion such as conscription for the armed forces and Government priorities for essential materials and services in short supply, but theoretically and practically the economic problem could be solved as it is in peacetime through the agency of the free market. We say practically, because this is how it was actually done forty years ago in the case of the Boer War. The Army was then composed of volunteers and the Government obtained them and the materials required for the war by raising funds from taxation and borrowing, and using that purchasing power to acquire factors in the open market. The economy adapted itself to this changed situation and the whole operation was conducted as a sort of new industry alongside existing enterprise. The only problem of economic importance was the transfer of monetary resources to the Government to enable it to command the real resources necessary for the war. The social complications were insignificant. Thus there was nothing in the situation which was not amenable to orthodox economic practice or outside the analytical scope of orthodox economic theory. War was a change in the external data of economics, and the resultant alteration in the conditions of demand set up repercussions and entailed adjustments similar to those produced by any change in external data. The theory and practice of economics can embrace such disasters as a crop failure or a local earthquake: they can equally embrace such a large scale event as a war. Let us apply the analysis to the present state of affairs.

In peaceful conditions the contemporary resources of labour and capital in this country could with full employment have produced £7,000 million worth of goods and services annually. For the conduct of the war the Government alone requires £4,000 million of these goods and services. By taxation and borrowing it acquires £4,000 million of purchasing power and thereby command over goods and services to that amount. This means an enormous diversion of resources into the forms of activity required by the Government, but this diversion automatically results from the change in the direction of demand. Where the community of private individuals previously called the tune to the extent of £7,000 million (let us ignore the peacetime expenditure of the Government) it can now only call the tune to the extent of £3,000 million, the Government coming in as substitute demander for the balance. Labour and capital which previously produced for private demand will now have to produce for Government demand. By a rigid refusal to expand credit beyond the point necessary to secure full employment the Government could bring about this change-over to war economy without any danger of inflation. This is the simple economics of the matter and if we were discussing a Boer War with a Government expenditure of £300 million, this would be the simple practice of it.

Now theoretically the economics of a war costing £300 million a year need not differ from the economics of one costing £4,000 million. There are economists of repute who can demonstrate that all the results brought about by priorities, controls, limitation of supplies orders and the whole complicated machinery of regulation could be equally well brought about by the free play of the price mechanism. They would go further and claim that better results could be achieved and more cheaply. These economists are not fools, but just pure economists. They know everything about the science of pure economics and nothing of the old art of political economy; and they are largely responsible for the discredit into which the science has fallen. They have no social imagination and therefore no social sympathy, and as a result they have sold the goodwill of liberal economics for a mess of analytical pottage. For the difference between a war costing £300 million a year and a war costing £4,000 million is

the difference between a minor and a major disaster just as the difference between 7 per cent. unemployment and 30 per cent. unemployment is the difference between a minor depression and a major social catastrophe. After a certain point new principles and methods must be applied. These economists wanted to solve the 1931 crisis through the ordinary price mechanism and their policy brought down Bruning and brought in Hitler.

Suppose an Atlantic liner experiences exceptionally bad weather during the whole crossing. The passengers groan in the staterooms or the cabins, and the dining rooms, the bars and the promenade decks are deserted. The captain spends days and nights on the bridge and the crew work till they drop. At the end of the voyage the cabin stewards get the large tips and the others have a lean trip. As a result of the delay the ship is turned round in a hurry and all shore leave is cancelled. All this is part of the luck of the sea. No one suggests that there should be a forcible redistribution of tips to remedy hardship: no one suggests that the Government should give a special grant to compensate the owners or that other shipping companies should come to their aid. But if the liner suffers shipwreck new principles come into operation. No doubt the pure economist could demonstrate that one way of allocating the scarce lifebelts and places in the boats is to sell them to the highest bidder. No doubt one economical way of securing the assistance of neighbouring ships is to invite tenders. But not even in the palmy days of *laissez faire* were these methods adopted, and no economist has committed himself to these arguments in print. Women and children first and a bullet for the man who tries to rush the boats. And a 40,000-ton liner will go to the aid of a tramp.

What we are doing in this war is to run the ship of State partly as a vessel in a typhoon and partly as an ordinary liner with millionaires in the first class and a rabble in the steerage. There is no major principle but only a medley of expedients, a hotch-potch of compulsion and free play which results in shrieking anomalies. (A shakedown under damp arches on newspapers advertising 350-guinea fur coats.) Think of all the talk about equality of sacrifice and about the elimination of profit from the war. Think of the passages in the King's Christmas speech about common perils and common sufferings willingly shared, about a real desire to share burdens and resources alike, about all of us being in the front line and danger together, and ask whether these sentiments correspond to what is going on around us.

This island is a fortress: such is the favourite simile in ministerial exordiums. Have any Ministers thought in terms of fortress economics? Do their metaphors really envisage the community as a garrison? The economic principle for a fortress under siege is communism in necessities and no luxuries. Every able-bodied man has to serve and only the old, the infirm and the very young are exempt. No wonder our leaders fight shy of the full implications of the fortress metaphor. No one draws property income in a fortress. No one gets one ration for filling sandbags and another in virtue of the possession of real estate inside or outside the citadel. Fortress economics is the economics of an egalitarian society in which no one can buy ease and safety at the expense of his fellow men. A rapid survey of the shifts and expedients which have passed for economic policy so far will show how far we are from this ideal.

The Treasury policy envisaged the war solely in its monetary aspect. This approach, which ignores the real cost and the distribution of that cost, has been the curse of our war economics. The Treasury was solely concerned with keeping down the nominal monetary cost of the war and with the object, laudable in itself, of avoiding inflation. It was interested in the redistributed national income as a source of revenue, but not in the processes redistributing that income. Indeed it was anxious to avoid any commitments which might arise out of that process of redistribution. It had no policy for distressed areas, for distressed industries or for distressed individuals. It ordered coffins for air-raid corpses but had no plans for destitute survivors. When London hotels and boarding houses were emptied by the first evacuations the proprietors were ignominiously haled before the County Courts for defaults on rates. When the coastal towns were financially crippled by military restrictions the Treasury had no policy for their relief. Local taxation has become a farce and an anomaly in existing circumstances, but nobody in Whitehall seems to have the faintest realisation of this. The belated scheme for the insurance of war damaged property shows that the original Treasury approach to this problem lacked all reality and sense. Even now there is no satisfactory scheme for people displaced from employment by air raids. Large sections of the population are expected to take the pot luck characteristic of private enterprise, while others such as coal

owners and railway shareholders are given every facility by State control and legislation to pass on their burdens.

Thus the simultaneous agitation, often coming from the same people, for a reduction in E.P.T. and for increasing compulsion of labour is just one of the many facets of our muddled war economy. With regard to the first it is argued that 100 per cent. E.P.T. eliminates all incentive to efficiency. The *Sunday Express* reports without apparent dismay that there are a number of firms who make the maximum profit allowed in a few weeks and then slack off and do not bother. All the City Editors seem to agree that the extra profit incentive must be restored since the incentive of saving the country is apparently not sufficient. But no incentive is required to secure the use of property in wartime. It is there and cannot be removed. The problem of the war economy would have been largely solved if all investment income had been suspended for the duration and only human service had been rewarded. If property owners received their capital back intact at the end of the war they would still owe a debt to the fighters and workers who preserved it.

The other agitation for increasing compulsion of labour is based on the argument that a million more men are required for the armed forces and a million more workers for the war industries, and that this transfer can only be achieved by forcible displacement. In fact the forcible displacement is already being done by juggling with the reserved ages and by the various limitation-of-supplies regulations. What this means in practice is that persons earning perhaps £8 a week in the printing, electrical and distributive trades are being pushed into munitions probably at lower wages and most probably away from their homes. In their new location they must compete for accommodation with the leisured and the well-to-do, and in the scramble for the lessening supplies of consumption goods they will be outbid every time by persons who can if necessary draw on capital. The rich can still get most of the good things and occupy most of the best places. Meanwhile Sir Robert Kindersley goes round stumping for what he calls National Savings. This concept in itself shows the hollowness of our war economics. There is no national saving in wartime. There is in fact dis-saving. One can talk of national borrowings or even of national lendings, but national savings is meaningless in real terms. We have to keep up this sorry pretence because there is no consistency, no logic and no justice in our war economy. In the military sense we are all in the front line: economically there is as great a gap as ever between the men in the trenches and the base-wallahs safe in the rear.

SALARIED STATE MEDICAL SERVICE

ONCE again Lord Horder's Committee has reported, and its suggestions have been embodied in another White Paper, drawing attention to the risks of disease in the shelters and the need for precautions. But Yashmak masks and the like to prevent nose-and-mouth-borne infections, and even the terribly necessary segregation of tubercular patients, only stress the gravity of the conditions.

Insistence upon the individual doing his or her part in reducing the risks, which will be with us throughout the epidemic months of winter, is proper and essential. It is like asking us to put out an incendiary if it comes through our roof, not only for our own sakes but for the sake of our neighbours, to whom the fire might spread. But we as individuals are not asked to supply the anti-aircraft batteries or man the Spitfires or the fire-pumps.

That is equally true of disease. We have a right to expect that those to whom we trust our general safety shall provide the barrage against infection, and organise adequate measures for dealing with it if it should break through these defences. That is the job for trained, professional disease-fighters, the doctors and the public health authorities.

When I wrote on October 19th, in THE NEW STATESMAN AND NATION, that we were facing a winter campaign which would be waged not by the R.A.F., nor by the Army, nor by the Navy but the doctors on the Home Front, it was an implied challenge to the medical profession, because the doctors were not then organised for such a campaign. Nor are they now. Nor can they be, so long as their private interests conflict with their public duty.

In last week's *Lancet*, Dr. Sinclair-Loutit and Dr. Shirlaw put the case bluntly to their colleagues in the medical profession:

The medical profession must realise that medicine must be replanned to serve new units—not only units in the Army, but the community units repre-

mented by the shelter crowds. Medicine has ceased to be an affair of contract between two individuals. It is the concern of the nation as a whole. It can only be served by what, in effect, must become a State medical service.

For years the B.M.A. has been organising *against* a State Medical Service. (I have attended every British Medical Association Conference for the past eleven years and write with the insight of that experience.) The general practitioners have resisted every "intrusion" of public medical services, even including Maternity and Child Welfare Clinics and the paying of salaries to specialists in Municipal Hospitals. When legislation has forced the issue, the B.M.A. has fought a rearguard action in defence of the fees of private doctors. Clinics have been an anathema to the backwoodsmen of the B.M.A. The clinics were giving medical facilities to those who needed it, but who were regarded by the more reactionary general practitioners mainly as potential fee-payers.

Similarly, with the Shelter Medical Service. Proposed by the Horder Committee and sanctioned by the Ministry of Health, the public saw in this new service a strong line of defence against epidemics. Medical posts were to be established and doctors and nurses were to be in attendance. Hundreds of thousands were to be under the vigilant care of the doctors. Praise be to Hippocrates!

On closer examination the Ministry's proposals were found to be full of reservations, concessions to the B.M.A. or to the Treasury or to both. Doctors were to visit the bigger shelters. They were to be on call if the nurses needed them. Local authorities were to appoint such a rota of doctors and might be allowed (but were not encouraged) to appoint full-time doctors at £500 a year for the biggest shelters where conditions made such an appointment necessary. The medical supplies at the dispensaries were to be strictly limited to palliatives of the aspirin, sal volatile, cough mixture and gargle variety. The rota doctors were to be paid a guinea a night for their shelter visits. They were to give "immediate medical care," to deal with accidents, infectious disease cases, and minor ailments. The serious cases were to be sent by ambulance to hospital. The interpretation of these duties has been left to the doctors.

So we got a "tip-and-run" Shelter Medical Service of the "am-I-needed-here-No?-Goodnight" kind. Under a rota, prevention of disease must be perfunctory. Yet the Minister for Health has warned us, with grim truth, that more people may be killed by going into shelters than would be killed by the bombs. Nor is it just a case of "pandering to the people in the big shelters," about which I hear so much in official quarters. For infection which bursts through the doors of the shelters which nurtured it will reach out to the 83 per cent. of the population which, as Mr. Morrison has told us, "stay put" in their domestic shelters or in their homes.

There is another aspect of this Shelter Medical Service which, to me at least, is ugly and a reproach to the high ideals for which the medical profession is supposed to stand. The shelter doctors are allowed to give sufferers only superficial treatment. The Ministry of Health has laid it down that the medical post must not be regarded as a free outpatient clinic.

I make frequent visits to shelters of every type, and to medical posts. I have heard the stories of shelter marshals and I have the testimony of doctors, not in one locality but in many. I have the visible evidence of the authorised "dispensaries."

Here is an actual case from my own experience. In one of the biggest East End shelters and at one time one of the worst, a volunteer doctor, now replaced, helped by a distinguished woman doctor and privately subscribed funds, created an excellent medical post, supplied with all essential drugs. Not a thing, not even the authorised drugs, not even a chair for the doctor was supplied by the Medical Officer of Health.

I was there during a heavy Blitz, admiring the way the volunteer post had been organised, with its index of every patient, and the kindness and humanity with which the motley procession of shelter users were being handled. A shelter marshal came running in from the neighbouring crypt. A woman was desperately ill. The doctor must come quickly. The doctor hesitated. It was a job for the rota doctor. But his hesitation was momentary. He bundled his instruments into his bag, apologised to the crowd in the waiting-room and hurried hatless into the Blitz.

The crypt was one where the sarcophagi have been emptied of the crumbled dead and are being used as beds. Every race, colour and condition of people seemed to be sheltering there. We had to pick our way through the huddle and climb a hen-ladder to reach a vault high up in the wall, a tomb that had belonged to a long-dead family

and now sheltered a living one. A little brown face under a turban blinked at us with startled eyes in the flickering candle-light before it disappeared under the bedclothes beside its Indian mother. A turbaned ex-Bengal Lancer was lying there, with his black shovel beard and his magnificently carved face as still as that of a monumental Crusader. We had to step over him to reach an inner vault, unventilated and as cold as an ice-box, where the sick woman had to spend her nights.

The patient had a high temperature; she was breathing with difficulty. The doctor examined her carefully and found she was suffering from asthma and in bad shape. Again he hesitated. In deference to his medical colleagues he should have prescribed—Sal volatile? Cough mixture? Aspirin? Or a gargle? But, above all, he should have said, "And see your doctor in the morning." He did—but only after he had sent the shelter marshal running to his own dispensary for the prescription he knew she must have.

In another instance a child was running a temperature, suffering from acute influenza. The rota doctor wanted to send it home through the Blitz. He was not even ready to bring down its temperature, because that was the job of the doctor whom it should "see in the morning." It was put in the shelter sick-bay by others and carefully nursed throughout the night.

To reduce it to an absurdity. If a shelter user is suffering from a boil which at home he would be treating himself (perhaps under the orders of his panel doctor) the medical post would be "treating him" against the rules if it supplied the hot fomentation. No, he must "see his doctor in the morning."

One day there may be a coroner's inquest. Would any shelter doctor dare to face the public and say, "I told the patient to see a doctor in the morning. I, a qualified doctor, dedicated to the service of humanity, passed by on the other side." If so, I hope the Medical Officer and the Minister of Health would be subpoenaed with him.

Nobody wants to deprive doctors of their livelihood. Hitler has done his best to do so. Practices in heavily bombed areas have practically disappeared—into reception areas or into the shelters. And on that point there is a pertinent question. Panel patients cannot attend their doctors. Workers, during the Blitz, get "home" to the shelters at the siren (and anyway in heavily bombed districts many doctors have abandoned evening surgery) and leave at day-break or before. They cannot visit morning surgery without loss of a day's pay and, from the national standpoint, a day's work. Are the doctors giving the service for which they draw panel fees?

But the question of fees is something apart from medical duty, and yet here it is being allowed to dominate a situation fraught not only with immediate human suffering but with imminent public peril. The Shelter Medical Post must not, according to official decree, become a clinic where incipient illness or disease (and doctors have been insisting for years on early diagnosis and anticipation of disease) could be detected and treated, and where health would be put before sickness. No, every shelter user, since fees come from sickness not from health, must be regarded as the potential sick patient of a private doctor. That, itself, is burking the fact 2,000,000 out-patients a year attended London hospitals before the war, choosing the clinic and the specialists rather than the family doctor.

The Shelter Medical Service is, in any case, limited to the bigger shelters, while 90 per cent. of the population in the bombed districts are in smaller ones. It is, I suggest, a shoddy piece of window-dressing.

Doctors must be mobilised. They must be organised on a salaried basis. The shelters provide not only risks but opportunities. People are there in mass, as children at school are in mass. They can be reached as they never were before. "Health consciousness" can be impressed upon shelterers even while disease is being checked. For instance, one enlightened shelter doctor provided two hundred mugs and induced at first only a small proportion of the shelter users to gargle each night. When, however, shelter cough brought patients to the medical post, the doctor asked if the gargle had been used. If not, why not? The common excuse was that the gargle tasted nasty. When he had provided a tablet or a more agreeable gargle, he got the majority of the shelter population on "gargle drill." They began to see that, in any case, the gargle was better than the cough.

The British Medical Association must be told firmly to face the facts of a Salaried Medical Service. And the breakdown of medical practice goes, as I hope to show in a further article, far beyond the shelter issue. The Old Order has gone, even in medicine.

RITCHIE CALDER

THE NAZIS IN NORWAY

NAZI methods of conquest are now well known to depend as much for their success upon novel political techniques as upon novel military ones. In fact, it would almost be true to say that the military means of conquest are merely a part of a general social-political strategy, which aims at finding the weakest points in the enemy's moral defences and then stabbing hard and deep at them with the combined weight of body-destroying machines and soul-destroying corruption. When the victim finds his civil and military bases destroyed and his interior lines disintegrated, he surrenders. Sometimes he recognises what is coming to him and surrenders in advance.

The next step in the process is the assimilation of the victim to the Nazi political-economic system. Here again, the Nazis have sought to improve upon the wasteful and dangerous method of holding down a sullen and rebellious people by means of an army of occupation. Instead, an attempt is made to exercise *political* control through the machinery of administration, economic organisation and propaganda, whilst the forces of coercion and suppression are kept in reserve as a final arbitrament. The technique differs, of course, according to the varying social and political conditions in the occupied territories, but the general principles appear to be the same in all those in Northern and Western Europe. A review of the methods by which this technique is being applied in one of them—Norway—will therefore be of value in enabling us to gain a general picture of the means by which Hitler seeks to establish his "New European Order."

The attempt to gain *political*, as distinct from *military* control of Norway has passed through three phases. The opening of the first phase coincided with the military attack, and was characterised by the attempt to gain *political* control without having to fight for it.

The military offensive was launched at 11 p.m. on Monday, April 8th. At 4.30 a.m. on the following morning, the German Minister presented to the Norwegian Government a series of demands which would have involved the complete surrender of the Norwegian administration to the Nazis. The demands were indignantly refused, and the Germans then proceeded to their next step—an attempt to capture the King and the Government. Their object was clearly twofold: first, to deprive the Norwegian people of their leaders, and secondly, to be in a position to exercise moral (and possibly physical) pressure in order to compel the legal administration to hand over its power in a "constitutional" way. This attempt was defeated by quick movements on the part of the King, the Government and the Storting, which left Oslo and proceeded to Hamar, and thereafter to Elverum.

The next move of the Nazis was to attempt by negotiation to secure the resignation of the Nygaarsvold Government and the creation of a new Government which would be prepared to collaborate with Germany. These negotiations broke down completely, however, through Hitler's insistence that the Norwegian Fascist, Quisling, should be Prime Minister, a proposal which was bound to be rejected even by the most Right-wing members of the Storting, in view of the fact that Quisling's party, the Nasjonal Samling (National Concentration) was not even represented in that body. Why Hitler should have persisted in supporting so insignificant a political figure is as great a mystery as Stalin's earlier support of the Finnish Communist, Kuusinen. The only explanation would appear to be that in each case the dictator's protégé had been able to build up a fantastically unreal picture of his influence in his own country. Be that as it may, Hitler's advisers were unwise enough to pursue their plans to their logical conclusion, by instructing Quisling to form his own Government, in the hope that the Storting, faced by the *fait accompli*, would give him their endorsement. This first effort of Quisling's was, however, a miserable failure. He was completely isolated by the solid opposition of the people and of the Norwegian civil and military authorities, and within five days he resigned in ignominy.

In concluding the review of the first period, one important circumstance must be noted. When the Oslo batteries, in the opening engagement of the Norwegian campaign, succeeded brilliantly in sinking the warships *Gneisenau* and *Blücher*, they sent to the bottom of the sea all the higher members of the German Administrative Staff and several detachments of the Gestapo. These were the men, of course, who would have "advised" Quisling in the conduct of his Government, and who would have taken over control of all those branches of the administration for which suitably compliant Norwegian officials were not available. Without their aid, and with the popular resistance unbroken, Quisling's first attempt was bound to fail.

For some time after the collapse of the first Quisling Government, the Nazis were preoccupied with the task which they had hoped to avoid: that of conquering Norway by military force. Norwegian military resistance ended with the withdrawal of the King and Government from Norway on June 7th, and the Nazis now had to face once more the problem of establishing an administration which would serve as the instrument of their political control. During this second of the three phases which we have distinguished, the German effort was directed towards securing a *submissive Norwegian Government with a pretended legal and constitutional basis*.

Such a basis could, in fact, only be fictitious, since on April 9th the Storting had unanimously accorded full powers to the King and Government and had given them permission to exercise those powers, if necessary, *from outside Norwegian territory*. King Haakon and the Nygaarsvold Government had, therefore, been placed in an impregnable constitutional position.

In spite of this insuperable difficulty, the Reichskommissar for Norway, Terboven, was determined to conjure up, if at all possible, some kind of fictitious legal basis for the administration which was to undertake the task of governing Norway on behalf of the Nazis. In the middle of June, the Norwegian newspapers were ordered to begin a propaganda campaign for a "real Government" to take the place of the Nygaarsvold administration, which was "no longer able to exercise its functions." At the same time, systematic pressure was placed on all the leading Norwegian politicians and civil servants to make some "reasonable" settlement with the Nazis, failing which, they would be compelled to accept a new Nazi-imposed Quisling Government, or, even worse, a purely German administration. Terboven proposed the establishment of a Council of State (Riksråd) to exercise governmental powers until the end of the war, when Norway would return—presumably—to its normal forms of democratic government. In order to provide such a Council with some semblance of constitutional authority, however, King Haakon was to be requested to abdicate and the Nygaarsvold Government to resign. The Presidential Board of the Storting (in reality only a kind of "Speaker's Committee" with no executive powers) was actually persuaded to pass a resolution to this effect and to send it to the Norwegian authorities in Britain. The Storting was then to be summoned, and would be invited to ratify the resolution of the Presidential Board, confirm the abdication of the King, nullify the full powers which it had given to the Nygaarsvold Government, and hand over similar powers to the proposed Council of State.

As soon as the plan became publicly known, however, it evoked a storm of protest from the Norwegian people. The Stortingsmen were snowed under by indignant letters and other forms of protest from their constituents, and in the face of such a clear demonstration of public opinion it was quite impossible even for the most conciliatory element amongst them to yield to Terboven's suggestions. In such circumstances, the German Commissioner realised that there would be no hope of obtaining a majority in the Storting, even with the maximum exercise of indirect pressure, and the plan to summon it was, for the time being, abandoned.

In spite of this setback, however, there were some elements amongst the Norwegian political leaders who cherished the illusion, born of a mixture of despair and bitterness, that it might be possible to find some *modus vivendi* with the Nazi conquerors. Terboven sought to take advantage of this feeling in his last attempts to form a representative Government which would be ready to collaborate with him. He entered into direct negotiations with the leaders of the various political parties. The negotiations were carried on, however, with typical Nazi dishonesty. One party was played off against another; concessions were made by the Nazis on one day only to be withdrawn or subtly modified on the next; any concession on the part of the Norwegians, on the other hand, was immediately followed by the presentation of new demands. Terboven's endeavour to confuse and divide the Norwegian parties was, however, blocked by their firm insistence on conditions which were quite incompatible with the type of régime he was endeavouring to build up. The main conditions were that Quisling's party, the Nasjonal Samling, should not have control of the Council of State; that the Civil Government should be carried on in accordance with Norwegian law; that the Nazis should not interfere with the civil administration; and that civil liberties—especially freedom of speech, press and association—should be preserved.

The consequent failure of these negotiations marks the end of the second phase. Terboven was summoned to Berlin, and returned with explicit instructions from the Führer. By the execution of these instructions, the third phase is inaugurated: the direct im-

position by Nazi "Diktat" of a new political régime in Norway.

On September 26th, Reichskommissar Terboven announced, by wireless broadcast, a series of decrees which were to take effect immediately. King Haakon was declared deposed; the Nygaarsvold Government was dismissed; all political parties were dissolved except the Nasjonal Samling; and a Council of Ministers was to be formed under the leadership of Herr Quisling. Finally, a "New Order"—the familiar Order of Nazi Gleichschaltung—was to be introduced in Norway. Thus was ended at one stroke the whole policy of trying to find a way to conciliate the mass of the Norwegian people and the really representative political parties. The abandonment of this policy was in itself eloquent testimony to the deep-seated hostility of the Norwegian people towards the Nazi rulers and the Nazi political ideology. Even had the conciliation policy proved successful, there is no doubt that Terboven's objective would have been the gradual perversion of the Norwegian administration into a thorough-going Fascist régime—with the great advantage, however, from the German point of view, that the leading political parties, those which really had their roots in the masses, would have been fatally implicated in this transition. Through the failure of this policy, the Nazis find themselves forced to make use of methods which must further arouse the hostility of people and to rely on a Norwegian Fascist organisation which is no more than a "Splitterpartei" and which cannot even find enough capable people within its own ranks to perform the supernumerary duties allotted to them by their Nazi overseers.

Yet even in this third phase of the German attempt to gain political control of Norway, it is important to note that the emphasis is still placed on the use of political rather than military methods of exercising power. The civil administration is placed, with German permission, in Norwegian hands. The Norwegian press is gleichgeschaltet under the control of a Norwegian Minister of Propaganda—Herr Lunde, an active member of the Nasjonal Samling. Broadcasting is to be turned into an instrument of Fascist propaganda under the control of a Norwegian—Herr Kristi. The police force (which formerly had a mainly local character) is being rigidly centralised by another Norwegian—Herr Lie. Where suitable Norwegian Fascists cannot be found, as, for example, in the Trade Unions, then the method employed is that of "weeding-out": successive groups of leaders appointed by the members are arrested or dismissed until men are found, generally of second or third rank, who are willing to comply with the requirements of the régime. Similar methods are applied to the employers' organisations, the farmers' co-operatives, and other voluntary social institutions.

In this way, an attempt is being made to Nazify the whole of Norway's political, economic and social life under the apparent leadership of people who are themselves Norwegians. The Nazis are well aware, of course, that Quisling has no solid basis in the Norwegian population and that he could not maintain his position for a day if the German administrators, Gestapo and military forces were withdrawn. Yet the position is not without its advantages for the Nazis. They can afford to keep their own coercive apparatus in the background, as a mere emergency reserve. If the people complain against the measures imposed by the régime, then the Germans can lay the blame on their Norwegian functionaries. And if, in course of time, the Quislingites were to succeed in gaining any mass-support (that is, in creating an *indigenous* Fascist movement), then the Nazis would have the comparatively simple task of supervising a régime which would, in fact, be a puppet reproduction of their own régime in Germany.

The situation in Norway to-day is the very reverse of stable. The passive resistance of the people is strong and appears to be increasing; and at some time in the future the counter-offensive of the democratic forces will, it is to be hoped, intervene with shattering effect. Nevertheless, it is already possible to gain a general picture of the policy which the Nazis are *attempting* to apply in those Northern and Western European countries which are not to be treated like Poland, as mere slave-colonies.

The Nazis are seeking to achieve a "permanent revolution" in Europe; that is, to provide, as they have done in Germany itself, a political as well as a military basis for their conquests. The "New European Order" is no empty slogan but a serious attempt to establish a Nazi-controlled hierarchical régime throughout Europe, which will be proof against disintegration from within as well as attack from without. Whether it will succeed will depend both upon the type of *political* counter-offensive which is undertaken by Britain and her allies and upon the strength of the internal popular resistance.

W. N. WARBEY